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I. DEFENDANT'S QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOi^  REVIEW 
Petitioner presents these questions for review: 
1. Whether or not Class A misdemeanor information requires the 
written signature of the Weber County Attorney. 
2. Whether or not a warrant is valid and legal when the complainant 
misrepresented the facts justifying the issuance of the same, and when it 
was issued before the alleged crime petitioner was found guilty of. 
3. Whether or not the petitioner was denied the due process of law. 
Also, whether or not the court lacked jurisdiction over the case. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff restates the questions to be reviewed as whether, in ruling 
on any of defendant's questions above, the Court of Appeals Memorandum 
Decision is. 
a) in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals 
or the Supreme Court on the same issue of law; or 
b) a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a 
lower court as to call for an exercise of this Court's poWer of supervision or 
c) deciding an important question of municipal, state or federal law 
which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court) 
III. DECISION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED 
The Utah Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision, (not published) filed 
October 2,1987, is the decision sought to be reviewed. 
No Order for a rehearing nor cross petition has be^ en filed. 
IV. JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to consider defendant's Writ of Certiorari is conferred on 
this court by Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2-2 (5) (1987) 
V. CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTIONS 
10-3-703. Penalty for violation of ordinance - Civil penalty for unauthorized 
use of property - Procedural rules. 
Unless otherwise specifically authorized by statute, the governing body 
of each municipality may provide a penalty for the violation of any municipal 
ordinance by a fine not to exceed the maximum class B misdemeanor fine 
under Section 76-3-301 or by a term of imprisonment up to six months, or by 
both the fine and term of imprisonment. The governing body may prescribe a 
minimum penalty for the violation of any municipal ordinance and may impose 
a civil penalty for the unauthorized use of municipal property, including, but 
not limited to, the use of parks, streets, and other public grounds or 
eouipment. Rules of civil procedure shall be substantially followed. 
77-1 -5. Prosecuting party. 
A criminal action for any violation of a state statute shall be 
prosecuted in the name of the State of Utah. A criminal action for violation 
of any county or municipal ordinance shall be prosecuted in the name of the 
governmental entity involved. 
77-2-1. Authorization to file information. 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, no information may be filed 
charging the commission of any felony or class A misdemeanor unless 
authorized by a prosecuting attorney. 
78-2-2 (5). (Effective January 1, 1988), Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a 
petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals 
adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it 
by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
O 
78-4-5 (3). Jurisdiction - Exclusive jurisdiction - Concurrent jurisdiction. 
(3) The circuit court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of all 
cases arising under or by reason of the violation of any itnunicipal ordinance 
involving persons 18 years of age and over in those municipalities in which a 
municipal department of the circuit court exists or has been created. 
RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Rule 33 (a) Damages for Delay or Frivolous Appeal. 
If the Court shall determine that a motion made or appeal taken under 
these Rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages and 
single or double costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing 
party. 
Rule 43. Considerations Governing Review of Certiorari 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion, and wil l be granted only when there are special and important 
reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly 
measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that wil l 
be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same 
issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this Court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
prodeedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to 
call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by 
this Court. 
Rule 46. Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
(a)(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and concise 
argument for the issuance of the writ. (See Rule 43.) 
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(e) Absence of Accuracy, Brevity, and Clarity. 
The failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy, brevity, and 
clarity whatever is essential to a ready and adequate understanding of the 
points requiring consideration wil l be a sufficient reason for denying the 
petition. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with violating a Roy City Ordinance, of 
custodial interference, by Roy Circuit Court Court information, dated June 3, 
1985. 
A non-jury trial was held June 19,1985, at which defendant was 
represented by counsel and was convicted. 
On July 23,1985, defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on the June 19, 
1985, conviction. 
Said appeal was dismissed by the Second District Court for lack of 
prosecution on December 27,1985. 
Some twenty months later, on February 13,1987, defendant filed a 
Motion to Vacate the June 19,1985, conviction. 
The City of Roy filed a Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Motion to Vacate 
with Memorandum of Points and Authorities, defendant responded and based 
on the pleadings filed and oral arguments of both parties, a Third Circuit 
Court Order was entered on March 18,1987, denying defendant's Motion to 
Vacate. 
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On April 9,1987, defendant filed a Notice of Appeal "from the Ruling on 
Appeal" (District Court) and from the Motion to Vacate denial. 
Defendant timely filed his Docketing Statement and Brief and on June 3., 
1987, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Englargement of Time to Respond to 
Defendant's Docketing Statement and Motion for Summary Disposition, which 
was denied. 
Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Brief and Dismiss 
Defendant's Appeal or in the alternative, to Compel Defendant to File a Brief 
Which Substantially Complies with the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
which was denied, without prejudice to renewal after filing of defendant's 
supplemental brief, but defendant was ordered to file a supplemental brief 
fully complying with Rule 24 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
including citations to the relevant portions of the recorfd. 
Defendant filed a supplemental brief on August 12,1987, and on 
September 1,1987, plaintiff was given a week's extension from the regular 
thirty day period within which to file its responsive brief because the record 
was not available on September 1, 1987 and on September 18,1987, plaintiff 
filed its Motion to Strike Defendant's Supplemental Brief and Dismiss 
Defendant's Appeal. 
In its Memorandum Decision filed October 2,1987, the Utah Court of 
Appeals granted the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Supplemental 
Brief and on its own motion, affirmed the order of the third Circuit Court 
denying defendant's Motion to Vacate. 
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Defendant has not made the record from the Court of Appeals a part of 
this proceeding. Plaintiff believes it is not necessary for the Court to have 
that record before it to make its decision because the Court of Appeals 
opinion is explicit and captures the essence of defendant's arguments. 
VII. MOTION FOR DISMISSAL 
Plaintiff, pursuant to R. Utah Sup. Ct. 46 (e), moves the court to dismiss 
defendant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Review of Decision by Court of 
Appeals Affirming and Reversing the Final Administrative Decision of the 
District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for the County of Weber, 
State of Utah. 
Defendant's Petition is inaccurate in several respects. The citation to 
the Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325 (1977) case is inaccurate (pp. i i , 9); he 
misstates the ruling in Williams v. Summit County, 41 Utah 2d 72, 123 P.938 
(1912) (pp. 2, 8, 11); under the Section entitled Argument, Question No. 1, the 
body of the argument contains arguments to other questions; under the 
Section entitled Argument, Question No. 3, defendant makes statements that 
are not in the record and are not true "The Roy City Attorney told the clerk 
that the respondent could not have transcripts to perfect his own appeal 
because he was not an attorney." (p. 15) 
Defendant's Petition is difficult to understand. One sentence is over 
half a page long (p. 10) and another is incomplete (p. 14). In the Statement of 
the Case section, there are references to a tape, but no transcription of the 
tape from the original trial was made a part of the record. 
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Defendant made no attempt to furnish the court with issues or legal 
analysis of issues it can properly look at in deciding whether to grant 
certiorari. 
Plaintiff believes that defendant has attended or is attending Utah 
State University and has the capacity to present a Petition that complies 
substantially with the rules governing Petitions for Writ of Certiorari. 
His failure to present with accuracy, brevity and clarity whatever is 
essential to a ready and adequate understanding of the points requiring 
consideration is a sufficient reason for denying the petition. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
The questions that defendant presents for argument should be 
considered in terms of the R. Utah S. Ct. 46 (a)(9) requirement to categorize 
arguments in the four subsections of R. Utah S. Ct. 43. 
1. Whether or not class A misdemeanor Information requires the 
written signature of the Weber County Attorney. 
Plaintiff generally agrees with defendant's statement (p. 2) that a 
Class A Information requires the signature of a County Attorney, but believes 
this question is irrelevant for two reasons. 
A. The Court of Appeals did not disagree with defendant's argument 
that Class A Informations require the signature of a County Attorney and 
therefore the Court of Appeals did not decide a question of law that falls into 
any of the subsections of R. Utah S. Ct. 43, which would give this court reason 
to grant certiorari. 
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B. Even if the Court of Appeals had addressed this issue, the offense of 
which defendant was convicted was not charged as a Class A misdemeanor, 
but a Class B misdemeanor under a validly enacted Roy City Ordinance and the 
Court of Appeals found that the procedure followed was proper, (p. 2 of Utah 
Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision.) 
Defendant cites Williams v. Summit County in his argument addressing 
the question of whether a class A misdemeanor Information requires the 
county attorney's signature. Williams v. Summit County has nothing in it 
remotely connected to the form of Informations or who signs them. 
Defendant raises another issue in the body of his argument on the 
signing of Informations by county attorneys - the issue of conflict between 
city and state law or pre-emption. 
The court need not consider the conflict or pre-emption issue 
(hereinafter referred to as the enforceability issue) as the Court of Appeals 
made no ruling on that issue. The Court of Appeals specifically stated that 
the issue of enforceability was not before it and that even if that issue had 
been before it, the defendant did not persuade the Court that there was a 
conflict or that the field of custodial interference had been pre-empted by 
the state. 
Since the Court of Appeals did not consider the enforceability issue and 
therefore did not decide an important question of municipal, state or federal 
law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, this Court should 
not grant defendant's Petition for a Writ. 
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Even had those issues been timely raised, the easels defendant cites are 
irrelevant or can be distinguished. 
In Van Dam v. Morris defendant was charged with a class A 
misdemeanor and after a preliminary hearing in city court, defense counsel's 
motion to dismiss was granted. The issue decided by the Supreme Court was 
whether the city judge had the power to dismiss the class A prosecution. 
The holding in the Van Dam case has no application to the case at bar since 
the offense defendant was charged with was a class B misdemeanor. 
Hakki v, Faux, 16 Utah 2d 132, 396 P.2d 867 (1964) was decided under 
1964 rules of criminal procedure. Those rules have since been substantially 
rewritten. The question decided in Hakki was whether the District Court had 
the power to act when proper procedure invoking the original jurisidiction of 
the District Court was not followed. The important question here is whether 
or not current procedure was properly followed. Prosecution of the case at 
bar was begun properly, by Information and in the proper court. (The specific 
question of Circuit Court jurisdiction is addressed in argument on the 
defendant's third question.) 
The Williams v. Summit case is distinguishable from the case at bar 
and nowhere in the opinion appears the statement "Statute law wil l always 
prevail over ordinances" (pp. 2,8, 11), although defendant could possibly imply 
that as dictum. 
Defendant Williams argued he was entitled to recover a license or tax 
paid under protest. There was a special statute that determined how and upon 
what conditions liquor license fees should be fixed by tf^ e board of county 
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commissioners. The statute required an amount of not less than $400.00 per 
year and the County attempted to amend its own ordinance which originally 
set the fee at $100.00 per quarter to $300.00 per quarter. The County erred by 
not posting the amending ordinance in proper form. The issues the 1912 
Williams court decided were: 
Was an ordinance fixed by the present board of commissioners binding 
on future commissioners? Whether the defendant paid the license tax 
under protest? Neither of these issues have relevance to the case at bar. 
Implicit in Williams is the concept that statutes regulating the liquor 
industry prevail over county ordinances. Some aspects of the liquor industry 
are pre-empted by the many statutes and regulations that govern the industry. 
That industry is a more natural subject for the legislature to pre-empt than 
the custodial interference field. 
2. Whether or not a warrant is valid and legal when the complaintant 
misrepresented the facts justifying the issuance of the same, and when it 
was issued before the alleged crime petitioner was found guilty of. 
Defendant did not furnish the record to the Court of Appeals so that the 
court could determine whether either of these questions were raised at trial, 
but neither issue was pursued in the appeal to District Court. Since the Court 
of Appeals did not look at either question, its decision does not f it under any 
of the categories in R. Utah S. Ct. 43 and therefore certiarari should be denied. 
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3, Whether or not the petitioner was denied the due process of law. 
Also, whether or not the court lacked jurisdiction over the case. 
Defendant provides the court with no legal analysis of how he was 
denied due process and he makes statements that are not in the record and are 
untrue. 
Defendant does properly raise an issue which the Court of Appeals 
addressed - that of jurisdiction. However, defendant mikes no effort to fit 
the decision of whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction into one of the 
four categories in R. Utah S. Ct. 43 as required in R. Utah S. Ct. 46(a)(9). The 
affirmance of the Third Circuit Court decision cannot be attacked under the 
limited reasons in R. Utah S. Ct. 43 and certiorari should be denied. 
On its face, the Third Circuit Court had jurisidiction in this matter. 
Under a duly enacted ordinance, custodial interference is a Class B 
misdemeanor. 
The action was initiated by an Information signed by the complainant 
before the third circuit court judge. Municipalities are 
specifically empowered by statute to pass ordinances prescribing 
penalties not exceeding those prescribed for a Class B misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. Seciton 10-3-703 (1986). The offense charged was a 
Class B misdemeanor under the municipal ordinance. Accordingly, the 
Information was not defective under Utah Code Ann. Section 77-2-1 
(1982). Similarly, because the criminal action was initiated under a 
municipal ordiance, it was properly proseucted in the name of the 
municipality pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-1-5. Finally, the 
present case was within the jurisdiction of the circuit courts, which 
Olson acknowledges have exclusive jurisidiction under Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-4-5(3) (1987) over "all cases arising under or by reason of 
violation of any municipal ordinance involving persons 18 years of age 
and over in those municipalities in which a municipal department of the 
circuit court exists or has been created." (p. 2 Utah Court of Appeals 
Memorandum Decision) 
IX. EXTENSION TO FILE BRIEF OPPOSED 
Defendant requests a year in which to perfect a Brief. Note should be 
taken that defendant was given the opportunity to file a Supplementary Brief 
which would enable to the Court of Appeals to review his case. The Court of 
Appeals properly did not consider the Supplementay Brief because it 
contained irrelevant and immaterial matters that could only have been raised 
on direct appeal (p. I, 2 Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision). Plaintiff 
opposes defendant's request for any extension in which to get his original 
conviction before the courts. Public policy, judicial orderliness and economy 
of judicial time all require that judgments be accorded finality so that there 
is an end to litigation, and the ruling on this Writ should be the final review 
of this matter. 
X. REQUEST FOR DAMAGES 
After his original trial, Defendant had several remedies available to 
him. He failed to perfect or pursue them when he did not ask for a new trial, 
relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) (1) or (2) and when he failed to perfect 
the appeal of his original conviction to District Court. 
The conviction defendant seeks to have overturned was not a default 
judgment, summary disposition or result of a trial in absentia, but was the 
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result of a trial held some 30 months ago, at which defendant was 
represented by highly competent counsel. 
Defendant's original pleadings to vacate the judgment were difficult to 
follow, yet he used the same wording in his appeal to the Court of Appeals and 
he did not attempt to follow the rules of appellate procedure. He was given a 
second chance to comply with the rules and did file a supplemental brief. The 
supplemental brief was in no closer compliance with the rules than the first 
and defendant's petition to this court is the same basic document he filed in 
Third Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals. 
After denying defendant's Motion to Vacate, Judge Browning took the 
time to explain to defendant the procedure for expunging his conviction from 
the record. Plaintiff realizes expungement is not analogous to vacating the 
conviction, but defendant seems to be harrassing the City with continued 
efforts to get another hearing on his original convictiorj. Defendant's 
contentions to the Court of Appeals were meritless and it is frivolous to 
pursue review of the same, especially when defendant refuses to comply with 
the rules governing his remedies. 
Plaintiff has been required to respond to defendant's many frivolous 
attempts to retry his conviction and pursuant to R. Utah S. Ct. 33, requests 
that defendant reimburse Plaintiff for just damages, including reasonable 
attorney's fees expended in responding to this Writ. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of November, 1987. 
Deborah Badger for Plaintiff, Roy City 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, with postage affixed, four copies of the 
foregoing Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certioriari to defendant, this 
30th day of November, 1987, at the following address: Franchot L. Olson, 145 
North Fourth West, Logan, Utah 84321. 
DEBORAH BADGER 
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OCT 0 21987 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Roy City, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Franchot Olson, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clef* of the Court 
Utah Court of App^eJe 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not for Publication) 
Case No. 870122-CA 
Before Judges Billings, Davidson and Garff (On Law and Motion) 
PER CURIAM: 
This case is before the Court on the motion of respondent 
to strike appellant's brief and dismiss the appeal. We grant 
the motion to strike appellant's supplemental brief and the 
Court, on its own motion, affirms the order of the Third 
Circuit Court denying appellant's Motion to Vacate. 
Appellant 
custodial int 
ordinance, in 
was sentenced 
the district 
appeal for la 
February 13, 
conviction wh 
1987, and Ols 
Franchot L. Olson ("Olson") was convicted of 
erference, a Class B misdemeanor under a municipal 
a non-jury trial held on June 19, 1985. Olson 
on June 9, 1985, and appealed the conviction to 
court. The Second District Court dismissed the 
ck of prosecution on December 27, 1985. On 
1987, defendant made a "Motion to Vacate" the 
ich was denied by the circuit court on March 18, 
on initiated the present appeal. 
On June 24, 1987, this Court ordered Olson to file a 
supplemental brief "fully complyinq with Rule 24 of the Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals and including citations to the 
relevant portions of the record,M Olson's Supplemental Brief 
contains citations that are apparently references to a 
transcript of the 1985 trial. That transcript is not, however, 
a part of the record before this Court, nor is the present 
appeal an appeal from the 1985 conviction. The only issue 
before this Court is whether the circuit court erred in denying 
appellant's Motion to Vacate. The supplemental brief will be 
disregarded pursuant to Rule 24(k) because it contains 
"irrelevant" and "immaterial" matters that could only have been 
raised on the direct appeal from the conviction. This Court 
proceeds to consider the Brief of Appellant filed on May 6, 
1987, to the extent that it pertains to the ruling of the Third 
Circuit Court on Olson's Motion to Vacate. 
Olson's principal claim is that the 1985 judgment and 
sentence of the Third Circuit Court are void because that court 
lacked jurisdiction. Olson was prosecuted under a Roy City 
ordinance prohibiting "custodial interference", a Class B 
misdemeanor. The action was initiated by an Information signed 
by the complaining witness before a circuit court judge. Olson 
contends that the offense charged was a Class A misdemeanor 
under state statutes and thus the information must have been 
"authorized by the prosecuting attorney" pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-2-1(1982). Olson further contends that the offense 
was a violation of a state statute and must be prosecuted in 
the name of the State pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-5(1982). 
Olson's claims that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction 
are clearly without merit. Municipalities are specifically 
empowered by statute to pass ordinances prescribing penalties 
not exceeding those prescribed for a Class B misdemeanor. Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-703 (1986). The offense charged was a Class B 
misdemeanor under the municipal ordinance. Accordingly, the 
information was not defective under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-2-1(1982). Similarly, because the criminal action was 
initiated under a municipal ordinance, it was properly 
prosecuted in the name of the municipality pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-1-5. Finally, the present case was within the 
jurisdiction of the circuit courts, which Olson acknowledges 
have exclusive jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-4-5(3)(1987) over "all cases arising under or by reason of 
violation of any municipal ordinance involving persons 18 years 
of age and over in those municipalities in which a municipal 
department of the circuit court exists or has been created." 
Under the circumstances of this case, the Third Circuit 
Court correctly concluded that the judgment and conviction were 
not void for lack of jurisdiction, and properly denied the 
Motion to Vacate. 
Olson also contends that the Roy City Ordinance is 
"unconstitutional" or otherwise unenforceable because it is in 
conflict with the state statute proscribing custodial 
interference and, alternatively, that the subject matter of 
custodial interference is preempted by the state statute. 
Although Olson has not made a convincing argument that his 
constitutional rights were violated or that the state has 
preempted the field, those issues are not properly before us. 
The Third Circuit Court found that any challenge to the 
870122-CA 2 
enforceability of the municipal 
pursued in the direct appeal of 
which was dismissed for lack of 
The March 18, 1987 Order of 
ALL CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
ordinance must have been 
the underlying conviction, 
prosecution. We agree. 
the Circuit Court is affirmed* 
870122-CA 3 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROY CITY, a 
Municipal Corporation, 
Respondent, 
FRANCHOT L OLSON, 
Petitioner 
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
Case No 870409 
Priority No 
Deborah Badger, being first duly sworn under oath, states as 
follows 
1 I am an attorney licensed to practice law In the State of Utah 
2 I represent the plaintiff in the above entitled action and have 
done all of the legal work responding to defendant's petition for Writ of 
Certiorari 
3. I have spent more than 12 hours on this matter and the sum of 
$337 00 is a reasonable amount to charge in attorney fees for the work done 
in this matter to date, and is in accordance with the fees customarily 
charged for similar services in this area 
DATED this 20&* day of November, 1987 
DEBORAH BADGER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, 
1987 
Vc^u iLT^ -S> /YVMLDJ> 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Weber County 
My commission Expires 7-29-91 
OLSON TIME 
11/26 Thorough reading of Olson Petiton for Writ 
and summary response 
4.0 
11/27 Reading Rules of Supreme Court and cases 
Olson cites 
3.5 
11/28 Draft of Response to Writ 1.5 
11/29 Revisions to Response to Writ 3.0 
11/30 Preparation Table of Contents, Authorities, 
and Controlling Provisions , ~ 
ROY CITY VS. OLSON - CASE NO. 870409 
SUMMARY SEQUENCE OF EVENT$ 
6/3/85 Defendant charged w/custodial interference 
6/19/85 Defendant convicted of custodial interference 
7/23/85 Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on 6/19/85 conviction 
12/27/85 Appeal dismissed for failure to prosecute 
2/13/87 Defendant filed Motion to Vacate 6/19/85 judgment 
3/4/87 Plaintiff filed Motion to Dismiss defendant's Motion to Vacate 
3/87 Defendant responded to Motion to Dismisls 
3/11/87 Hearing on Motion to Vacate and Motion to Dismiss 
Motion to Vacate is denied 
3/18/87 Order entered denying defendant's Motion to Vacate 
4/9/87 Defendant filed Notice of Appeal 
4 & 5/87 Defendant timely filed Docketing Statement and Brief 
6/3/87 Plaintiff did not timely file a Motion for Summary Disposition 
and was denied an enlargement of time to do so 
6/3/87 Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Brief and Dismiss 
Defendant's Appeal or in the alternative, to Compel Defendant 
to File a Brief which Substantially Complies with the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, which was denied, without prejudice 
to renewal after .filing of defendant's supplemental brief and 
defendant was ordered to file a supplemental brief fully 
complying with Rule 24 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, including citations to t,he relevant portions of the 
record. 
ROY CITY VS. OLSON - CASE NO. 870409 
SUMMARY SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - Page Two 
8/12/87 Defendant filed a supplemental brief 
9/1/87 Plaintiff travelled to Salt Lake to examine the record, but it 
could not be located that afternoon and plaintiff was given a 
week's extension from the regular thirty-day period within 
which to file its responsive brief 
9/18/87 Plaintiff filed its Motion to Strike Defendant's Supplemental 
Brief and Dismiss Defendant's Appeal 
10/3/87 Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision filed granting plaintiff's 
Motion to Strike Defendant's Supplemental Brief and affirming 
the order of the Third Circuit Court denying defendant's Motion 
to Vacate 
